



**CFA Society  
India**

## **Practitioners' Insights : Investing Under Uncertainties**

**By Kuntal Shah**

**13<sup>th</sup> May 2020**



# Investing Under Uncertainties

“Man is a deterministic device thrown into a probabilistic universe. In this match, surprises are expected”

— Michael Lewis



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
# Pre-COVID-19 Conditions

"It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future"  
- Niels Bohr




# Elevated Debt Levels and Rock Bottom Interest Rates

Figure 3. 'Lower for longer' rates in a world washed by debt (total debt by sector)




Source: IIF, Amundi. Data as of 2 March 2020.




yardeni.com

## Global Debt Imbalance Now Worse Than the Average of All Major Bubbles in the Last 30 Years



Source: BIS, IMF, Bloomberg



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# Negative Bond Yields and Currency Interplays : Supply or Price, but not Both?




Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Refinitiv, Bloomberg, Business Insider

**The Negative Bond Yield Matrix**

Country	6 Mo	1Yr	2Yr	3Yr	4Yr	5Yr	6Yr	7yr	8Yr	9Yr	10Yr	15 Yr	30 yr
Switzerland	-0.75	-0.64	-0.89	-0.91	-0.89	-0.87	-0.79	-0.76	-0.69	-0.63	-0.52	-0.29	-0.01
Germany	-0.58	-0.68	-0.74	-0.76	-0.74	-0.68	-0.64	-0.58	-0.46	-0.4	-0.31	-0.1	0.27
Netherlands	-0.59		-0.72	-0.7	-0.64	-0.61	-0.5	-0.42	-0.32	-0.25	-0.15	-0.01	0.3
Japan	-0.13	-0.17	-0.2	-0.22	-0.23	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.21	-0.16	-0.12	0.07	0.36
Denmark	-0.66		-0.7	-0.7		-0.68			-0.45		-0.28		
Austria		-0.54	-0.65	-0.63	-0.57	-0.47	-0.39	-0.28	-0.22	-0.14	-0.03	0.31	0.7
Finland			-0.66	-0.63	-0.61	-0.54	-0.45		-0.19		-0.01		0.56
Sweden	-0.4		-0.62			-0.55		-0.26			-0.01	0.18	
France	-0.59	-0.6	-0.68	-0.66	-0.62	-0.53	-0.41	-0.31	-0.21	-0.1	0.02	0.38	1.15
Belgium	-0.57	-0.58	-0.6	-0.66	-0.6	-0.54	-0.42	-0.25	-0.14	-0.06	0.09	0.4	
Slovakia		-0.33				-0.24	-0.5		0	0.18	0.26		
Ireland	-0.41	-0.55	-0.45		-0.46	-0.39	-0.24	-0.14	0.45		0.22	0.58	1.16
Slovenia		-0.48	-0.3			-0.31		-0.14			0.25		
Spain	-0.41	-0.39	-0.4	-0.34	-0.27	-0.21	-0.06	0.08	0.2	0.29	0.43	0.8	1.47
Portugal	-0.38	-0.34	-0.37	-0.25	-0.17	-0.14	0.05	0.16	0.28	0.44	0.55	0.95	1.5
Malta	-0.23	-0.2		-0.1		0.02					0.74		
Bulgaria		-0.13		-0.01		0.05		0.37			0.58		
Italy	-0.16	-0.02	0.22	0.71	1.03	1.31	1.53	1.61	1.77	1.82	2.12	2.45	3.17
USA	2.19	2.03	1.81	1.75		1.78		1.89			2.03		2.52




# Scale of Historical Bull Runs



Source: Bloomberg




# Duration of Boom and Bust : Decreasing Duration and Increasing Frequency





# Valuation at the Extremities




“The Fed, in effect, has become a serial bubble blower”  
– Stephen Roach

# Sources of Stock Price Appreciation

“Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world” – Archimedes

November 1907 to November 1916



August 1921 to September 1929



June 1932 to May 1946



May 1947 to December 1961




June 1962 to December 1968




December 1974 to August 1987



December 1987 to August 2000



February 2003 to October 2007







March 2009 to December 2019



 Inflation       Dividend Yield       Earnings Growth       Valuation Changes




# Easy Money and Congenial Interest Rates are Necessary Conditions for Bubbles




# Low Future Interest Rates Embedded in Current High Valuations

**S&P Composite: 1871-Present**  
Nominal Price with the Trailing 12-Month P/E Ratio

dshort.com  
February 2020  
As of January




**Average 10-year S&P 500 Annualized real total return based on Price/Average 10-year Earnings**



**S&P 500 valuation summary**

Metric	Aggregate index		Median stock	
	Current	Historical %ile	Current	Historical %ile
P/E to growth (PEG)	1.5 x	97 %	1.9 x	100 %
EV / Sales	2.1 x	94	2.7 x	100
EV / EBITDA	11.3 x	88	11.4 x	99
Price / Book	2.9 x	76	3.3 x	98
Forward P/E	17.4 x	88	17.7 x	95
Free cash flow yield (FCF)	4.4 %	43	4.8 %	30
Cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE)	23.7 x	85	NA	NA
<b>Median</b>		<b>88 %</b>		<b>98 %</b>


**Stock Market Bubbles Happen at 90<sup>th</sup> Percentile-Plus Valuations**






# Significant Role of Buybacks in the Current Valuation

Buybacks have consumed about one-quarter of developed market companies' operating cash flows





Source: State Street Global Advisors, FactSet, as of December 31, 2019. Based on rolling 12-month operating cash flow.

Buybacks have provided significant support to global equity markets  
Attribution of total cumulative returns for the MSCI World Index



Source: State Street Global Advisors, FactSet, as of March 26, 2020.


# Significant Role of Interest Rates in the Current Valuation



Data as at April 8, 2020. Source: Thomson Financial, S&P, Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Board, Factset.




# COVID-19 Moving Parts



“People take the longest possible paths, digress to numerous dead ends, and make all kinds of mistakes. Then historians come along and write summaries of this messy, nonlinear process and make it appear like a simple, straight line”- Dean Kamen




# A Modern Pandemic in the Era of Airlines and Social Media




## Twelve Large Pandemic Events with at least 100,000 deaths

Event	Start	End	Deaths
Black Death	1331	1353	75,000,000
Great Plague of London	1665	1666	100,000
First Asia Europe Cholera Pandemic	1816	1826	100,000
Second Asia Europe Cholera Pandemic	1829	1851	100,000
Russia Cholera Pandemic	1852	1860	1,000,000
Global Flu Pandemic	1889	1890	1,000,000
Sixth Cholera Pandemic	1899	1923	800,000
Encephalitis Lethargica Pandemic	1915	1926	1,500,000
Spanish Flu	1918	1920	100,000,000
Asian Flu	1957	1958	2,000,000
Hong Kong Flu	1968	1969	1,000,000
H1N1 Pandemic	2009	2009	203,000

## Supply and demand shocks in one fell blow




Supply shock



Demand shock




# A Highly Contagious Global Pandemic Triggering Multiple Exogenous Shocks



Liquidity dependent, inherently interconnected and a complex adaptive system

# Framework of Investing in the Post-Covid-19 Situation





# Odds, Frequency & Impact – All Three Matter

## Frequency vs. Magnitude : Probability and outcome, both matter

### Good Probability, Bad Expected Value

Probability	Outcome	Weighted Value
70%	+1%	+0.7%
30%	-10	-3.0
100%		-2.3%

### Bad Probability, Good Expected Value

Probability	Outcome	Weighted Value
70%	-1%	-0.7%
30%	+10	+3.0
100%		+2.3%

### Expected Value

Expected Value is the weighted average value for a distribution of possible outcomes.


Take the probability of loss times the amount of possible loss from the probability of gain times the amount of possible gain. That is what we're trying to do. Its *Imperfect*, but that's what it's all about  
- Warren Buffett

### Risk vs. Uncertainty


Risk : We don't know the outcome, but we know what the underlying distribution looks like (incorporates the element of loss / harm)

Uncertainty : We don't know the outcome, and we don't know what the underlying distribution looks like (Need not incorporate loss / harm)  
- Frank Knight


# Unknown Unknowns : Biological Perspective









# Corporate Business : Operating Managers' Perspective








# Asset Market Perspective




# Flight to Safety : Rising Spreads

### 10 Year Treasury vs. AAA vs. BAA Spread




During Covid-19 peak period, investors left Global Equities in bear territory and took refuge in the safe haven asset Gold

Markets Return Since Feb 19, 2020




Huge bounce-back seen in markets due to combination of unprecedented policy support and a flattening viral curve

Markets Return Since Apr 1, 2020



### Figure 1: Recession Risks Will Mount If Average High-Yield EDF Metric Extends Its Climb

sources: Moody's Investors Service, NBER, Moody's Analytics





# Ring of Moral Hazard





# A Tale of Two Centuries : 1910–1930 vs. 2000–2020

“It's a recession when your neighbour loses his job; It's a depression when you lose yours”  
– Harry S. Truman




# The Great Depression vs. The Great Recession vs. The Great Lockdown


	Great Depression 1930s	Global Financial Crisis 2008	Ongoing COVID-19 Recession
Bank Failures	9,096 - 50% of banks (Jan. 1930- March 1933)	57 - 0.6% of banks (Dec. 2007 - May 2009)	Banks well capitalized, new NPA cycle likely
Unemployment Rate	25%	8.5%	14.7% (09-05-2020) and counting
Economic Decline	-26.5% (1929 1933)	-4.1% (last quarter 2007 - second quarter 2009)	Severe and counting
Biggest Decline in Dow- Jones Industrial Average	-89.2% (Sept. 3, 1929 - July 8, 1932)	-53.8% (Oct. 9, 2007- March 9, 2009)	Unfolding movie
Change in Prices	-25% (1929 - 1933)	+0.5% (Dec. 2007-March 2009)	Unfolding movie
Emergency Spending Programs	1.5% of GDP for 1 year (increase in 1934 budget deficit)	2.5% of GDP for 2 years (2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act)	Fiscal Stimulus > 11% of GDP (08-05-2020) and counting
State's Response	Raise taxes, cut spending	Federal stimulus plan gives fiscal relief to states to lessen impact of tax increases	Rate cuts, asset purchases, back stopping money/ bond markets, USD swap lines and ongoing measures
Increase in Money Supply by Federal Reserve	17% (1933)	125% (Sept. 2008- May 2009)	13.7% (27-04-2020) and counting

# 1910-1930 Conditions in the Era of the Spanish Flu Pandemic and The Great Depression

## Total U.S. Debt as a % of GDP





## Unemployment Rate, 1928-1938



Sources: *European Historical Statistics: 1750-1970*;  
*Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*.

## United States Mortality Rates

\* References: Vital Statistics of the United States 1937, 1938, 1943, 1944, 1949, 1960, 1967, 1976, 1987, 1992; Historical Statistics of the United States - Colonial Times to 1970 Part 1



Source : Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau, European Historical Statistics, Historical Statistics of the United States.





# Process

“The essence of investment management is the management of risks, not the management of returns”  
– Benjamin Graham



# What are the Qualities that Bring Longevity, Resilience and Anti-Fragility?




Parameter	Fragile Companies	Resilient/Robust Companies	Anti-Fragile Companies : Resilience with Optionality
System	Efficiency optimized	Redundancy & buffers driven	Degeneracy
Error Considerations	Hate errors : Irreversible, large errors leading to blowups	Longevity of growth	Fail fast, frequently, but cheaply
Incentives	No skin in the game	Skin in the game	Soul in the game
Management Consideration	Reactive Delayed by small changes in plans Siloed	Proactive Survives change in plans Partially connected	Positive serendipity Gets better when plans change Fully Integrated



# Ideal Portfolio Construct : Barbell Approach of Resilience and Optionality

Parameter	Resilient Companies	Anti-Fragile companies : Resilience with Optionality	Only Optionality	Survival Issues / Value Traps	Mediocre : Neither Resilient nor Optionality
Allocation	Core of portfolio	Rare but large allocation	Many positions but small allocation. Maximum of this bucket is capped	Avoidable commitment	Avoidable
Valuation Consideration	Timeline of investment horizon arbitrage	Longevity of growth and level of out of the money optionality implied in the current prices	Large total addressable market and network effects	Cheap, getting cheaper due to deteriorating core business	Market performer
Investor Consideration	Sector leadership  Markets share and adjacencies	Take advantage of volatility to add and trim positions  Rare companies; should be averaged up. Risk contribution will be more equally distributed i.e. large position represents the same risk as a very small position	Venture capitalist investing framework  Extension of tail leads to minimizing of error. Foot in the door and a possibility of averaging up or trimming down depending on subsequent outcome	Avoid commitment bias  Alternative opportunity cost	Filter out at screening level  Companies stuck in the middle, though they can give buy low, sell high, or round tripping opportunities

# Gold : Hedge Against Inflation and Negative Interest Rate








# High Yield Bonds


## Skyrocketing spreads

In the segment of markets where borrowers have lower credit ratings, borrowing costs have risen sharply.





Issuer (US\$ Secondary Levels)	Rating (M / S / F)	Amt. (mm)	Coupon	Price	Yield	G Spread	Z Spread	YTD (ΔYield)	YTD (ΔSpread)
Large National Bank	B1/BB--/--	300	5.50%	97.125	7.71%	753	735	3.44%	481
Gold Finance Co.	--/BB-/BB-	300	5.90%	76.45	17.13%	1689	1678	--	--
Housing Finance Co.	B3/--/--	350	6.38%	55.5	39.78%	3958	3942	21.46%	2282
Transport Finance Co.	--/BB/BB	500	5.10%	71.5	16.96%	1669	1660	--	--
Gold Finance Co.	--/BB/BB	550	4.40%	83	10.57%	1029	1021	--	--
Private Bank	Caa1/--/--	477	3.75%	84.25	10.45%	1020	1009	-0.07%	125
Finance Lending Co.	Ba3/--/B+	400	5.88%	63	23.98%	2372	2363	--	--

## Exhibit 4: Eurozone investment-grade and high-yield corporate bond spreads



Note: Based on Bloomberg Barclays Eurozone Corporate Bond indices. Source: Bloomberg

# Polarisation ?



Ongoing (2020)	Market Weight (in %)	Market Cap (in \$B)	Valuation (P/E)
Apple	5.4%	1164	19.1
Amazon	4.1%	1021	60.6
Microsoft	5.9%	1328	28.4
Alphabet	3.4%	793	23
Facebook	2.1%	434	19.6
FAAMG Aggregate	20.9%	4740	23

Tech Bubble (2000s)	Market Weight (in %)	Market Cap (in \$B)	Valuation (P/E)
Microsoft	4.5%	581	55.1
Cisco System	4.2%	543	116.8
Intel	3.6%	465	39.3
Oracle	1.9%	245	103.6
Lucent	1.6%	206	35.6
Tech Bubble Aggregate	15.8%	2040	55.1

NIFTY 50 (1970s)	Market Weight (in %)	Market Cap (in \$B)	Valuation (P/E)
IBM	7.1%	48	35.5
Eastman Kodak	3.6%	24	43.5
Sears Roebuck	2.7%	18	29.2
General Electric	2.0%	13	23.4
Xerox	1.8%	12	45.8
NIFTY 50 Aggregate	17.1%	115	35.5



# Talking Win-Win v/s Walking Win-Lose

Every day, managers must decide whether to enjoy a dollar of profit this year or two dollars a few years from now

## GILLETTE

- 1996 : Promised investors that it would grow its earnings at 15% to 20%.
- Began channel- stuffing products to its' distributors to meet projections
- CEO Kilts stopped issuing earning guidance
- Overextended pricing power benefited in short term but drove customers away and invited hungry new customers

## SOUTHWEST AIRLINES

- Kelleher : Sold a plane instead of laying off employees & formed a "No-Layoff Policy"
- 2010 : Was the biggest domestic airline in USA, with a market cap. Greater than all its domestic competitors combined
- Happy employees take care of the customers. Happy customers take care of the shareholders by coming back

## Boeing


- Boeing spent 74% of its Free Cash Flow in Stock Repurchase in the last 10 years. Cost cutting was one of the reasons for failure of its aircraft (737-MAX) and then the company had to be bailed out

## STARBUCKS










- 2010 : Howard Schultz said Starbucks had paid around \$300 MN in healthcare costs in 2010
- Decision Unpopular with the investors
- Declined the offer to cut Healthcare spending to retain the respect and value of his employees

## COSTCO











- 2008 : Galanti refused to make employees pay more than 10% for healthcare to save \$10 - \$20 Million per year
- Wanted to give their employees as much as they could in tough times



# Additional Resources : History is not a Road-Map, but a Compass













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







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


# Additional Resources : History is not a Road-Map, but a Compass





# Questions?



Not everything that can be  
counted counts,  
and not everything  
that counts can be counted.


*Albert Einstein*

There is no better teacher than  
history in determining the future...

There are answers  
worth billions of  
dollars in a \$30  
history book.

**CHARLIE MUNGER**

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